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Abstract. Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) are increasingly deployed in
safety-critical applications including autonomous vehicles and medical
diagnostics. To reduce the residual risk for unexpected DNN behaviour
and provide evidence for their trustworthy operation, DNNs should be
thoroughly tested. The DeepFault whitebox DNN testing approach pre-
sented in our paper addresses this challenge by employing suspiciousness
measures inspired by fault localization to establish the hit spectrum of
neurons and identify suspicious neurons whose weights have not been cal-
ibrated correctly and thus are considered responsible for inadequate DNN
performance. DeepFault also uses a suspiciousness-guided algorithm to
synthesize new inputs, from correctly classified inputs, that increase the
activation values of suspicious neurons. Our empirical evaluation on sev-
eral DNN instances trained on MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets shows
that DeepFault is effective in identifying suspicious neurons. Also, the
inputs synthesized by DeepFault closely resemble the original inputs,
exercise the identified suspicious neurons and are highly adversarial.
Keywords: Deep Neural Networks · Fault Localization · Test Input Generation
1 Introduction
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) [33] have demonstrated human-level capabilities
in several intractable machine learning tasks including image classification [10],
natural language processing [56] and speech recognition [19]. These impressive
achievements raised the expectations for deploying DNNs in real-world applica-
tions, especially in safety-critical domains. Early-stage applications include air
traffic control [25], medical diagnostics [34] and autonomous vehicles [5]. The re-
sponsibilities of DNNs in these applications vary from carrying out well-defined
tasks (e.g., detecting abnormal network activity [11]) to controlling the entire
behaviour system (e.g., end-to-end learning in autonomous vehicles [5]).
Despite the anticipated benefits from a widespread adoption of DNNs, their
deployment in safety-critical systems must be characterized by a high degree of
dependability. Deviations from the expected behaviour or correct operation, as
expected in safety-critical domains, can endanger human lives or cause significant
financial loss. Arguably, DNN-based systems should be granted permission for
use in the public domain only after exhibiting high levels of trustworthiness [6].
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Software testing is the de facto instrument for analysing and evaluating the
quality of a software system [24]. Testing enables at one hand to reduce the risk
by proactively finding and eliminating problems (bugs), and on the other hand to
evidence, through using the testing results, that the system actually achieves the
required levels of safety. Research contributions and advice on best practices for
testing conventional software systems are plentiful; [63], for instance, provides a
comprehensive review of the state-of-the-art testing approaches.
Nevertheless, there are significant challenges in applying traditional software
testing techniques for assessing the quality of DNN-based software [54]. Most
importantly, the little correlation between the behaviour of a DNN and the soft-
ware used for its implementation means that the behaviour of the DNN cannot
be explicitly encoded in the control flow structures of the software [51]. Further-
more, DNNs have very complex architectures, typically comprising thousand or
millions of parameters, making it difficult, if not impossible, to determine a pa-
rameter’s contribution to achieving a task. Likewise, since the behaviour of a
DNN is heavily influenced by the data used during training, collecting enough
data that enables exercising all potential DNN behaviour under all possible sce-
narios becomes a very challenging task. Hence, there is a need for systematic and
effective testing frameworks for evaluating the quality of DNN-based software [6].
Recent research in the DNN testing area introduces novel white-box and
black-box techniques for testing DNNs [20,28,36,37,48,54,55]. Some techniques
transform valid training data into adversarial through mutation-based heuris-
tics [65], apply symbolic execution [15], combinatorial [37] or concolic testing [55],
while others propose new DNN-specific coverage criteria, e.g., neuron cover-
age [48] and its variants [35] or MC/DC-inspired criteria [52]. We review related
work in Section 6. These recent advances provide evidence that, while tradi-
tional software testing techniques are not directly applicable to testing DNNs,
the sophisticated concepts and principles behind these techniques, if adapted ap-
propriately, could be useful to the machine learning domain. Nevertheless, none
of the proposed techniques uses fault localisation [4, 47, 63], which can identify
parts of a system that are most responsible for incorrect behaviour.
In this paper, we introduce DeepFault, the first fault localization-based white-
box testing approach for DNNs. The objectives of DeepFault are twofold: (i)
identification of suspicious neurons, i.e., neurons likely to be more responsible
for incorrect DNN behaviour; and (ii) synthesis of new inputs, using correctly
classified inputs, that exercise the identified suspicious neurons. Similar to con-
ventional fault localization, which receives as input a faulty software and out-
puts a ranked list of suspicious code locations where the software may be defec-
tive [63], DeepFault analyzes the behaviour of neurons of a DNN after training to
establish their hit spectrum and identifies suspicious neurons by employing sus-
piciousness measures. DeepFault employs a suspiciousness-guided algorithm to
synthesize new inputs, that achieve high activation values for suspicious neurons,
by modifying correctly classified inputs. Our empirical evaluation on the popular
publicly available datasets MNIST [32] and CIFAR-10 [1] provides evidence that
DeepFault can identify neurons which can be held responsible for insufficient
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network performance. DeepFault can also synthesize new inputs, which closely
resemble the original inputs, are highly adversarial and increase the activation
values of the identified suspicious neurons. To the best of our knowledge, Deep-
Fault is the first research attempt that introduces fault localization for DNNs to
identify suspicious neurons and synthesize new, likely adversarial, inputs.
Overall, the main contributions of this paper are:
– The DeepFault approach for whitebox testing of DNNs driven by fault lo-
calization;
– An algorithm for identifying suspicious neurons that adapts suspiciousness
measures from the domain of spectrum-based fault localization;
– A suspiciousness-guided algorithm to synthesize inputs that achieve high
activation values of potentially suspicious neurons;
– A comprehensive evaluation of DeepFault on two public datasets (MNIST
and CIFAR-10) demonstrating its feasibility and effectiveness;
The reminder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents briefly
DNNs and fault localization in traditional software testing. Section 3 introduces
DeepFault and Section 4 presents its open-source implementation. Section 5
describes the experimental setup, research questions and evaluation carried out.
Sections 6 and 7 discuss related work and conclude the paper, respectively.
2 Background
2.1 Deep Neural Networks
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Fig. 1. A four layer fully-connected DNN
that receives inputs from vehicle sensors
(camera, LiDAR, infrared) and outputs a
decision for speed, steering angle and brake.
We consider Deep Learning software
systems in which one or more system
modules is controlled by DNNs [13]. A
typical feed-forward DNN comprises
multiple interconnected neurons or-
ganised into several layers: the input
layer, the output layer and at least one
hidden layer (Fig. 1). Each DNN layer
comprises a sequence of neurons. A
neuron denotes a computing unit that
applies a nonlinear activation func-
tion to its inputs and transmits the result to neurons in the successive layer.
Commonly used activation functions are sigmoid, hyperbolic tangent, ReLU
(Rectified Linear Unit) and leaky ReLU [13]. Except from the input layer, every
neuron is connected to neurons in the successive layer with weights, i.e., edges,
whose values signify the strength of a connection between neuron pairs. Once
the DNN architecture is defined, i.e., the number of layers, neurons per layer and
activation functions, the DNN undergoes a training process using a large amount
of labelled training data to find weight values that minimise a cost function.
In general, a DNN could be considered as a parametric multidimensional
function that consumes input data (e.g, raw image pixels) in its input layer, ex-
tracts features, i.e., semantic concepts, by performing a series of nonlinear trans-
formations in its hidden layers, and, finally, produces a decision that matches
the effect of these computations in its output layer.
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2.2 Software Fault Localization
Fault localization (FL) is a white box testing technique that focuses on identi-
fying source code elements (e.g., statements, declarations) that are more likely
to contain faults. The general FL process [63] for traditional software (Fig. 5)
uses as inputs a program P, corresponding to the system under test, and a test
suite T, and employs an FL technique to test P against T and establish sub-
sets that represent the passed and failed tests. Using these sets and information
regarding program elements p ∈ P , the FL technique extracts fault localization
data which is then employed by an FL measure to establish the “suspicious-
ness” of each program element p. Spectrum-based FL, the most studied class of
FL techniques, uses program traces (called program spectra) of successful and
failed test executions to establish for program element p the tuple (es,ef ,ns,nf).
Members es and ef (ns and nf ) represent the number of times the correspond-
ing program element has been (has not been) executed by tests, with success
and fail, respectively. A spectrum-based FL measure consumes this list of tuples
and ranks the program elements in decreasing order of suspiciousness enabling
software engineers to inspect program elements and find faults effectively. For a
comprehensive survey of state-of-the-art FL techniques, see [63].
3 DeepFault
In this section, we introduce our DeepFault whitebox approach that enables to
systematically test DNNs by identifying and localizing highly erroneous neurons
across a DNN. Given a pre-trained DNN, DeepFault, whose workflow is shown
in Figure 2, performs a series of analysis, identification and synthesis steps to
identify highly erroneous DNN neurons and synthesize new inputs that exercise
erroneous neurons. We describe the DeepFault steps in Sections 3.1–3.3.
We use the following notations to describe DeepFault. Let N be a DNN with
l layers. Each layer Li, 1 ≤ i ≤ l, consists of si neurons and the total number of
neurons in N is given by s =∑li=1 si. Let also ni,j be the j-th neuron in the i-th
layer. When the context is clear, we use n ∈ N to denote any neuron which is part
of the DNNN irrespective of its layer. Likewise, we useNH to denote the neurons
which belong to the hidden layers of N, i.e., NH = {nij |1 < i < l, 1 ≤ j ≤ sj}.
We use T to denote the set of test inputs from the input domain of N , t ∈ T
to denote a concrete input, and u ∈ t for an element of t. Finally, we use the
function φ(t, n) to signify the output of the activation function of neuron n ∈ N .
3.1 Neuron Spectrum Analysis
The first step of DeepFault involves the analysis of neurons within a DNN to
establish suitable neuron-based attributes that will drive the detection and local-
ization of faulty neurons. As highlighted in recent research [18,48], the adoption
of whitebox testing techniques provides additional useful insights regarding in-
ternal neuron activity and network behaviour. These insights cannot be easily
extracted through black-box DNN testing, i.e., assessing the performance of a
DNN considering only the decisions made given a set of test inputs T .
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Fig. 2. DeepFault workflow.
DeepFault initiates the identification of suspicious neurons by establishing at-
tributes that capture a neuron’s execution pattern. These attributes are defined
as follows. Attributes attrasn and attr
af
n signify the number of times neuron n was
active (i.e., the result of the activation function φ(t, n) was above the predefined
threshold) and the network made a successful or failed decision, respectively.
Similarly, attributes attrnsn and attr
nf
n cover the case in which neuron n is not
active. DeepFault analyses the behaviour of neurons in the DNN hidden layers,
under a specific test set T, to assemble a Hit Spectrum (HS) for each neuron, i.e.,
a tuple describing its dynamic behaviour. We define formally the HS as follows.
Definition 1. Given a DNN N and a test set T , we say that for any neuron n ∈
NH its hit spectrum is given by the tuple HSn = (attrasn , attrafn , attrnsn , attrnfn ).
Note that the sum of each neuron’s HS should be equal to the size of T .
Clearly, the interpretation of a hit spectrum (cf. Def. 1) is meaningful only
for neurons in the hidden layers of a DNN. Since neurons within the input
layer L1 correspond to elements from the input domain (e.g., pixels from an
image captured by a camera in Fig. 1), we consider them to be “correct-by-
construction”. Hence, these neurons cannot be credited or held responsible for a
successful or failed decision made by the network. Furthermore, input neurons
are always active and thus propagate one way or another their values to neu-
rons in the following layer. Likewise, neurons within the output layer Ll simply
aggregate values from neurons in the penultimate layer Ll−1, multiplied by the
corresponding weights, and thus have limited influence in the overall network
behaviour and, accordingly, to decision making.
3.2 Suspicious Neurons Identification
During this step, DeepFault consumes the set of hit spectrums, derived from
DNN analysis, and identifies suspicious neurons which are likely to have made
significant contributions in achieving inadequate DNN performance (low accu-
racy/high loss). To achieve this identification, DeepFault employs a spectrum-
based suspiciousness measure which computes a suspiciousness score per neu-
ron using spectrum-related information. Neurons with the highest suspiciousness
score are more likely to have been trained unsatisfactorily and, hence, contribut-
ing more to incorrect DNN decisions. This indicates that the weights of these
neurons need further calibration [13]. We define neuron suspiciousness as follows.
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Table 1. Suspiciousness measures used in DeepFault
Suspiciousness Measure Algebraic Formula
Tarantula [23]:
attrafn /(attr
af
n +attr
nf
n )
attrafn /(attr
af
n +attr
nf
n )+attr
as
n /(attr
as
n +attr
ns
n )
Ochiai [42]:
attrafn√
(attrafn +attr
nf
n )·(attrafn +attrasn )
D* [62]:
attraf
∗
n
attrasn +attr
nf
n
∗ > 0 is a variable. We used ∗ = 3, among the most widely explore values [47,63].
Algorithm 1 Identification of suspicious neurons
1: function SuspiciousNeuronsIdentification(N , T , k)
2: S ← ∅ . suspiciousness vector
3: for all n ∈ N do
4: HSn ← ∅ . n-th neuron hit spectrum vector
5: for all p ∈ {as, af, ns, nf} do
6: apn =attr(T , p) . establish attribute for property p
7: HSn = HSn ∪ {apn} . construct hit spectrum (cf. Def. 1)
8: S = S ∪ {Susp(HSn)} . determine neuron suspiciousness (cf. Def. 2)
9: SN = {n|Susp(HSn) ∈ Select(S, k)} . select the k most suspicious neurons
10: return SN
Definition 2. Given a neuron n ∈ NHwith HSn being its hit spectrum, a neu-
ron’s spectrum-based suspiciousness is given by the function Suspn :HSn→R.
Intuitively, a suspiciousness measure facilitates the derivation of correlations
between a neuron’s behaviour given a test set T and the failure pattern of T as
determined by the overall network behaviour. Neurons whose behaviour pattern
is close to the failure pattern of T are more likely to operate unreliably, and
consequently, they should be assigned higher suspiciousness. Likewise, neurons
whose behaviour pattern is dissimilar to the failure pattern of T are considered
more trustworthy and their suspiciousness values should be low.
In this paper, we instantiate DeepFault with three different suspiciousness
measures, i.e., Tarantula [23], Ochiai [42] and D* [62] whose algebraic formulae
are shown in Table 1. The general principle underlying these suspiciousness mea-
sures is that the more often a neuron is activated by test inputs for which the
DNN made an incorrect decision, and the less often the neuron is activated by
test inputs for which the DNN made a correct decision, the more suspicious the
neuron is. These suspiciousness measures have been adapted from the domain of
fault localization in software engineering [63] in which they have achieved com-
petitive results in automated software debugging by isolating the root causes
of software failures while reducing human input. To the best of our knowledge,
DeepFault is the first approach that proposes to incorporate these suspiciousness
measures into the DNN domain for the identification of defective neurons.
The use of suspiciousness measures in DNNs targets the identification of a set
of defective neurons rather than diagnosing an isolated defective neuron. Since
the output of a DNN decision task is typically based on the aggregated effects of
its neurons (computation units), with each neuron making its own contribution
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Algorithm 2 New input synthesis guided by the identified suspicious neurons
Input: SN ← suspicious neurons (Algorithm 1), step← step size in gradient ascent
Ts← test inputs correctly classified by N , d←new inputs maximum allowed distance
1: function SuspiciousnessGuidedInputSynthesis(SN, Ts, d, step)
2: NT ← ∅ . set of synthesized inputs
3: for all t ∈ Ts do
4: Gt ← ∅ . gradient collection of suspicious neurons
5: for all n ∈ SN do
6: nv = φ(t, n) . determine output of neuron
7: G = ∂nv/∂t . establish gradient of neuron for t
8: Gt = Gt ∪ {G} . collect gradients of suspicious neurons for t
9: t′ ← ∅ . initialisation of input to be synthesised
10: for all u ∈ t do
11: ugradient =
∑
G∈Gt G/|Gt| . determine average gradient of u
12: ugradient = GradientConstraint(ugradient, d, step)
13: t′ = t′ _ {DomainConstraints(u+ ugradient)}
14: NT = NT ∪ {t′}
15: return NT
to the whole computation procedure [13], identifying a single point of failure (i.e.,
a single defective neuron) has limited value. Thus, after establishing the suspi-
ciousness of neurons in the hidden layers of a DNN, the neurons are ordered in
decreasing order of suspiciousness and the k, 1 ≤ l ≤ s, most probably defective
(i.e., “undertrained”) neurons are selected. Algorithm 1 presents the high-level
steps for identifying and selecting the k most suspicious neurons. When multiple
neurons achieve the same suspiciousness score, DeepFault resolves ties by pri-
oritising neurons that belong to deeper hidden layers (i.e., they are closer to the
output layer). The rationale for this decision lies in fact that neurons in deeper
layers are able to learn more meaningful representations of the input space [69].
3.3 Suspiciousness-Guided Input Synthesis
DeepFault uses the selected k most suspicious neurons (cf. Section 3.2) to synthe-
size inputs that exercise these neurons and could be adversarial (see Section 5).
The premise underlying the synthesis is that increasing the activation values of
suspicious neurons will cause the propagation of degenerate information, com-
puted by these neurons, across the network, thus, shifting the decision boundaries
in the output layer. To achieve this, DeepFault applies targeted modification of
test inputs from the test set T for which the DNN made correct decisions (e.g., for
a classification task, the DNN determined correctly their ground truth classes)
aiming to steer the DNN decision to a different region (see Fig. 2).
Algorithm 2 shows the high-level process for synthesising new inputs based
on the identified suspicious neurons. The synthesis task is underpinned by a gra-
dient ascent algorithm that aims at determining the extent to which a correctly
classified input should be modified to increase the activation values of suspicious
neurons. For any test input t ∈ Ts correctly classified by the DNN, we extract
the value of each suspicious neuron and its gradient in lines 6 and 7, respectively.
Then, by iterating over each input dimension u ∈ t, we determine the gradient
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value ugradient by which u will be perturbed (lines 11-12). The value of ugradient
is based on the mean gradient of u across the suspicious neurons controlled by
the function GradientConstraints. This function uses a test set specific step
parameter and a distance d parameter to facilitate the synthesis of realistic test
inputs that are sufficiently close, according to L∞-norm, to the original inputs.
We demonstrate later in the evaluation of DeepFault (cf. Table 4) that these
parameters enable the synthesis of inputs similar to the original. The function
DomainConstraints applies domain-specific constraints thus ensuring that u
changes due to gradient ascent result in realistic and physically reproducible
test inputs as in [48]. For instance, a domain-specific constraint for an image
classification dataset involves bounding the pixel values of synthesized images
to be within a certain range (e.g., 0–1 for the MNIST dataset [32]). Finally, we
append the updated u to construct a new test input t′ (line 13).
As we experimentally show in Section 5, the suspiciousness measures used by
DeepFault can synthesize adversarial inputs that cause the DNN to misclassify
previously correctly classified inputs. Thus, the identified suspicious neurons can
be attributed a degree of responsibility for the inadequate network performance
meaning that their weights have not been optimised. This reduces the DNN’s
ability for high generalisability and correct operation in untrained data.
4 Implementation
To ease the evaluation and adoption of the DeepFault approach (cf. Fig. 2), we
have implemented a prototype tool on top of the open-source machine learn-
ing framework Keras (v2.2.2) [9] with Tensorflow(v1.10.1) backend [2]. The full
experimental results are summarised in the following section.
5 Evaluation
5.1 Experimental Setup
We evaluate DeepFault on two popular publicly available datasets. MNIST [32]
is a handwritten digit dataset with 60,000 training samples and 10,000 testing
samples; each input is a 28x28 pixel image with a class label from 0 to 9. CIFAR-
10 [1]) is an image dataset with 50,000 training samples and 10,000 testing
samples; each input is a 32x32 image in ten different classes (e.g., dog,bird, car).
For each dataset, we study three DNNs that have been used in previous re-
search [1,60] (Table 2). All DNNs have different architecture and number of train-
able parameters. For MNIST, we use fully connected neural networks (dense)
and for CIFAR-10 we use convolutional neural networks with max-pooling and
dropout layers that have been trained to achieve at least 95% and 70% accu-
racy on the provided test sets, respectively. The column ‘Architecture’ shows the
number of fully connected hidden layers and the number of neurons per layer.
Each DNN uses a leaky ReLU [38] as its activation function (α= 0.01), which
has been shown to achieve competitive accuracy results [67].
We instantiate DeepFault using the suspiciousness measures Tarantula [23],
Ochiai [42] and D* [62] (Table 1). We analyse the effectiveness of DeepFault
instances using different number of suspicious neurons, i.e., k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 5, 10}
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Table 2. Details of MNIST and CIFAR-10 DNNs used in the evaluation.
Dataset Model Name # Trainable Params Architecture Accuracy
MNIST
MNIST 1 27,420 <5× 30> 96.6%
MNIST 2 22,975 <6× 25> 95.8%
MNIST 3 18,680 <8× 20> 95%
CIFAR-10
CIFAR 1 411,434 <4× 128> 70.1%
CIFAR 2 724,010 <2× 256> 72.6%
CIFAR 3 1,250,858 <1× 512> 76.1%
and k∈{10, 20, 30, 40, 50} for MNIST and CIFAR models, respectively. We also
ran preliminary experiments for each model from Table 2 to tune the hyper-
parameters of Algorithm 2 and facilitate replication of our findings. Since gra-
dient values are model and input specific, the perturbation magnitude should
reflect these values and reinforce their impact. We determined empirically that
step= 1 and step= 10 are good values, for MNIST and CIFAR models, respec-
tively, that enable our algorithm to perturb inputs. We also set the maximum
allowed distance d to be at most 10% (L∞) with regards to the range of each
input dimension (maximum pixel value). As shown in Table 4, the synthesized
inputs are very similar to the original inputs and are rarely constrained by d.
Studying other step and d values is part of our future work. All experiments were
run on an Ubuntu server with 16 GB memory and Intel Xeon E5-2698 2.20GHz.
5.2 Research Questions
Our experimental evaluation aims to answer the following research questions.
RQ1 (Validation): Can DeepFault find suspicious neurons effectively?
If suspicious neurons do exist, suspiciousness measures used by DeepFault
should comfortably outperform a random suspiciousness selection strategy.
RQ2 (Comparison): How do DeepFault instances using different suspi-
ciousness measures compare against each other? Since DeepFault can
work with multiple suspiciousness measures, we examined the results pro-
duced by DeepFault instances using Tarantula [23], Ochiai [42] and D* [62].
RQ3 (Suspiciousness Distribution): How are suspicious neurons found
by DeepFault distributed across a DNN? With this research question,
we analyse the distribution of suspicious neurons in hidden DNN layers using
different suspiciousness measures.
RQ4 (Similarity): How realistic are inputs synthesized by DeepFault?
We analysed the distance between synthesized and original inputs to examine
the extent to which DeepFault synthesizes realistic inputs.
RQ5 (Increased Activations): Do synthesized inputs increase activa-
tion values of suspicious neurons? We assess whether the suspiciousness-
guided input synthesis algorithm produces inputs that reinforce the influence
of suspicious neurons across a DNN.
RQ6 (Performance): How efficiently can DeepFault synthesize new in-
puts? We analysed the time consumed by DeepFault to synthesize new inputs
and the effect of suspiciousness measures used in DeepFault instances.
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5.3 Results and Discussion
RQ1 (Validation). We apply the DeepFault workflow to the DNNs from Ta-
ble 2. To this end, we instantiate DeepFault with a suspiciousness measure,
analyse a pre-trained DNN given the dataset’s test set T , identify k neurons
with the highest suspiciousness scores and synthesize new inputs, from correctly
classified inputs, that exercise these suspicious neurons. Then, we measure the
prediction performance of the DNN on the synthesized inputs using the standard
performance metrics: cross-entropy loss, i.e., the divergence between output and
target distribution, and accuracy, i.e., the percentage of correctly classified in-
puts over all given inputs. Note that DNN analysis is done per class, since the
activation pattern of inputs from the same class is similar to each other [69].
Table 3 shows the average loss and accuracy for inputs synthesized by Deep-
Fault instances using Tarantula (T), Ochiai (O), DStar (D) and a random se-
lection strategy (R) for different number of suspicious neurons k on the MNIST
(top) and CIFAR-10 (bottom) models from Table 2. Each cell value in Table 3,
except from random R, is averaged over 100 synthesized inputs (10 per class).
For R, we collected 500 synthesized inputs (50 per class) over five independent
runs, thus, reducing the risk that our findings may have been obtained by chance.
As expected (see Table 3), DeepFault using any suspiciousness measure (T,
O, D) obtained considerably lower prediction performance than R on MNIST
models. The suspiciousness measures T and O are also effective on CIFAR-10
model, whereas the performance between D and R is similar. These results show
that the identified k neurons are actually suspicious and, hence, their weights
are insufficiently trained. Also, we have sufficient evidence that increasing the
activation value of suspicious neurons by slightly perturbing inputs that have
been classified correctly by the DNN could transform them into adversarial.
We applied the non-parametric statistical test Mann-Whitney with 95% con-
fidence level [61] to check for statistically significant performance difference be-
tween the various DeepFault instances and random. We confirmed the significant
difference among T-R and O-R (p-value< 0.05) for all MNIST and CIFAR-10
models and for all k values. We also confirmed the interesting observation that
significant difference between D-R exists only for MNIST models (all k values).
We plan to investigate this observation further in our future work.
Another interesting observation from Table 3 is the small performance differ-
ence of DeepFault instances for different k values. We investigated this further
by analyzing the activation values of the next k′ most suspicious neurons accord-
ing to the suspiciousness order given by Algorithm 1. For instance, if k= 2 we
analysed the activation values of the next k′ ∈ {3, , 5, 10} most suspicious neu-
rons. We observed that the synthesized inputs frequently increase the activation
values of the k′ neurons whose suspiciousness scores are also high, in addition
to increasing the values of the top k suspicious neurons.
Considering these results, we have empirical evidence about the existence of
suspicious neurons which can be responsible for inadequate DNN performance.
Also, we confirmed that DeepFault instances using sophisticated suspiciousness
measures significantly outperform a random strategy for most of the studied
DNN models (except from the D-R case on CIFAR models; see RQ3).
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Table 3. Accuracy and loss of inputs synthesized by DeepFault on MNIST (top) and
CIFAR-10 (bottom) datasets. The best results per suspiciousness measure are shown
in bold. (k:#suspicious neurons, T:Tarantula, O:Ochiai, D:D*, R:Random)
k Measure MNIST 1 MNIST 2 MNIST 3
T O D R T O D R T O D R
1
Loss 3.55 6.19 4.03 2.42 3.48 3.53 3.97 2.78 7.35 8.23 6.36 3.66
Accuracy 0.26 0.16 0.2 0.59 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.49 0.16 0.1 0.13 0.39
2
Loss 3.73 6.08 3.18 2.67 3.12 3.76 4.08 0.9 4.27 6.81 6.5 3.06
Accuracy 0.16 0.23 0.4 0.58 0.23 0.23 0.13 0.77 0.29 0.13 0.26 0.56
3
Loss 4.1 6.19 6.25 1.14 2.39 3.94 3.04 1.61 3.33 7.59 6.98 2.91
Accuracy 0.23 0.23 0.33 0.77 0.46 0.26 0.23 0.67 0.26 0.06 0.16 0.61
5
Loss 4.63 6.68 6.97 1.1 2.49 3.64 3.48 0.94 4.15 7.22 6.47 1.22
Accuracy 0.23 0.23 0.13 0.79 0.26 0.26 0.2 0.73 0.16 0.1 0.26 0.77
10
Loss 4.97 6.95 7.4 1.3 2.08 3.06 3.82 0.49 4.45 7.16 5.9 0.57
Accuracy 0.23 0.2 0.23 0.75 0.4 0.23 0.26 0.86 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.87
k Measure CIFAR 1 CIFAR 2 CIFAR 3
T O D R T O D R T O D R
10
Loss 12.75 13.49 1.33 3.25 8.42 8.41 0 2.49 6.12 1.77 1.12 1.21
Accuracy 0.2 0.16 0.9 0.79 0.47 0.47 1.0 0.84 0.62 0.88 0.92 0.91
20
Loss 12.79 12.43 0.45 1.8 8.81 6.92 0.32 1.67 6.12 1.12 0.96 0.64
Accuracy 0.2 0.22 0.96 0.88 0.44 0.55 0.97 0.89 0.62 0.92 0.93 0.95
30
Loss 13.19 13.13 0.38 1.43 8.35 6.32 0.55 0.86 5.64 0.76 0.42 0.41
Accuracy 0.18 0.18 0.95 0.9 0.48 0.6 0.95 0.94 0.64 0.93 0.96 0.97
40
Loss 13.69 11.92 0.8 1.29 9.4 5.01 0.32 0.61 4.51 1.12 0.22 0.54
Accuracy 0.14 0.26 0.92 0.91 0.41 0.68 0.97 0.95 0.72 0.92 0.97 0.96
50
Loss 12.1 13.37 0.36 0.9 9.59 3.38 0 0.56 4.67 0.04 0.64 0.48
Accuracy 0.24 0.17 0.96 0.94 0.4 0.78 1.0 0.96 0.71 0.98 0.96 0.96
RQ2 (Comparison). We compare DeepFault instances using different sus-
piciousness measures and carried out pairwise comparisons using the Mann-
Whitney test to check for significant difference between T, O, and D∗. We show
the results of these comparisons in Appendix. We observe that Ochiai achieves
better results on MNIST 1 and MNIST 3 models for various k values. This re-
sult suggests that the suspicious neurons reported by Ochiai are more responsible
for insufficient DNN performance. D∗ performs competitively on MNIST 1 and
MNIST 3 for k ∈ {3, 5, 10}, but its performance on CIFAR-10 models is sig-
nificantly inferior to Tarantula and Ochiai. The best performing suspiciousness
measure in CIFAR models for most k values is, by a great amount, Tarantula.
These findings show that multiple suspiciousness measures could be used for
instantiating DeepFault with competitive performance. We also have evidence
that DeepFault using D∗ is ineffective for some complex networks (e.g., CIFAR-
10), but there is insufficient evidence for the best performing DeepFault instance.
Our findings conform to the latest research on software fault localization which
claims that there is no single best spectrum-based suspiciousness measure [47].
RQ3 (Suspiciousness Distribution). We analysed the distribution of suspi-
cious neurons identified by DeepFault instances across the hidden DNN layers.
Fig. 3 shows the distribution of suspicious neurons on MNIST 3 and CIFAR 3
models with k=10 and k=50, respectively. Considering MNIST 3, the majority
of suspicious neurons are located at the deeper hidden layers (Dense 4-Dense 8)
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Fig. 3. Suspicious neurons distribution on MNIST 3 (left) and CIFAR 3 (right) models.
irrespective of the suspiciousness measure used by DeepFault. This observation
holds for the other MNIST models and k values. On CIFAR 3, however, we can
clearly see variation in the distributions across the suspiciousness measures. In
fact, D∗ suggests that most of the suspicious neurons belong to initial hidden
layers which is in contrast with Tarantula’s recommendations. As reported in
RQ2, the inputs synthesized by DeepFault using Tarantula achieved the best
results on CIFAR models, thus showing that the identified neurons are actually
suspicious. This difference in the distribution of suspicious neurons explains the
inferior inputs synthesized by D∗ on CIFAR models (Table 3).
Another interesting finding concerns the relation between the suspicious neu-
rons distribution and the “adversarialness” of synthesized inputs. When suspi-
cious neurons belong to deeper hidden layers, the likelihood of the synthesized in-
put being adversarial increases (cf. Table 3 and Fig. 3). This finding is explained
by the fact that initial hidden layers transform input features (e.g., pixel val-
ues) into abstract features, while deeper hidden layers extract more semantically
meaningful features and, thus, have higher influence in the final decision [13].
RQ4 (Similarity). We examined the distance between original, correctly classi-
fied, inputs and those synthesized by DeepFault, to establish DeepFault’s ability
to synthesize realistic inputs. Table 4 (left) shows the distance between orig-
inal and synthesized inputs for various distance metrics (L1 Manhattan, L2
Euclidean, L∞ Chebyshev) for different k values (# suspicious neurons). The
distance values, averaged over inputs synthesized using the DeepFault suspi-
ciousness measures (T, O and D∗), demonstrate that the degree of perturbation
is similar irrespective of k for MNIST models, whereas for CIFAR models the
distance decreases as k increases. Given that a MNIST input consists of 784
pixels, with each pixel taking values in [0, 1], the average perturbation per input
is less than 5.28% of the total possible perturbation (L1 distance). Similarly,
for a CIFAR input that comprises 3072 pixels, with each pixel taking values in
{0,1,...,255}, the average perturbation per input is less that 0.03% of the total
possible perturbation (L1 distance). Thus, for both datasets, the difference of
synthesized inputs to their original versions is very small. We qualitatively sup-
port our findings by showing in Fig. 4 the synthesized images and their originals
for an example set of inputs from the MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets.
We also compare the distances between original and synthesized inputs based
on the suspiciousness measures (Table 4 right). The inputs synthesized by Deep-
Fault instances using T, O or D∗ are very close to the inputs of the random
selection strategy (L1 distance). Considering these results, we can conclude that
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Table 4. Distance between synthesized and original inputs. The values shown represent
minimal perturbation to the original inputs (<5% for MNIST and<1% for CIFAR-10).
k MNIST CIFAR
MNIST(CIFAR) L1 L2 L∞ L1 L2 L∞
1(10) 41.4 2.0 0.1 179.07 7216.6 15.46
2(20) 41.2 1.99 0.1 144.95 5897.4 12.45
3(30) 40.9 1.98 0.1 124.61 5073.9 10.67
5(40) 40.7 1.97 0.1 113.45 4579.2 9.89
10(50) 40.3 1.96 0.1 104.72 4273 9.24
Susp. MNIST CIFAR
measure L1 L2 L∞ L1 L2 L∞
Tarantula 40.3 1.97 0.1 180.23 6575.6 19.41
Ochiai 41.0 1.98 0.1 110.45 4825.3 7.84
DStar 41.5 1.99 0.1 109.4 4823.2 7.39
Random 39.2 1.92 0.1 121.73 4988.1 11.63
    
Fig. 4. Synthesized images (top) and their originals (bottom). For each dataset, suspi-
cious neurons are found using (from left to right) Tarantula, Ochiai, Dstar and Random.
DeepFault is effective in synthesizing highly adversarial inputs (cf. Table 3) that
closely resemble their original counterparts.
Table 5. Effectiveness of suspiciousness-guided in-
put synthesis algorithm to increase activations val-
ues of suspicious neurons.
k: MNIST(CIFAR)
Datasets 1(10) 2(20) 3(30) 5(40) 10(50)
MNIST 98% 99% 97% 97% 91%
CIFAR 91% 92% 90% 89% 88%
RQ5 (Increasing Activa-
tions). We studied the ac-
tivation values of suspicious
neurons identified by Deep-
Fault to examine whether
the synthesized inputs in-
crease the values of these neu-
rons. The gradients of sus-
picious neurons used in our
suspiciousness-guided input synthesis algorithm might be conflicting and a global
increase in all suspicious neurons’ values might not be feasible. This can occur if
some neurons’ gradients are negative, indicating a decrease in an input feature’s
value, whereas other gradients are positive and require to increase the value of
the same feature. Table 5 shows the percentage of suspicious neurons k, aver-
aged over all suspiciousness measures for all considered MNIST and CIFAR-10
models from Table 2, whose values were increased by the inputs synthesized by
DeepFault. For MNIST models, DeepFault synthesized inputs that increase the
suspicious neurons’ values with success at least 97% for k ∈{1,2,3,5}, while the
average effectiveness for CIFAR models is 90%. These results show the effective-
ness of our suspiciousness-guided input synthesis algorithm in generating inputs
that increase the activation values of suspicious neurons (see Appendix).
RQ6 (Performance). We measured the performance of Algorithm 2 to synthe-
size new inputs (Table 10 in Appendix). The average time required to synthesize
a single input for MNIST and CIFAR models is 1s and 24.3s, respectively. As
expected, the performance of the algorithm depends on the number of suspicious
neurons (k), the distribution of those neurons over the DNN and its architecture.
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For CIFAR models, for instance, the execution time per input ranges between 3s
(k=10) and 48s (k=50). We also confirmed empirically that more time is taken
to synthesize an input if the suspicious neurons are in deeper hidden layers.
5.4 Threats to Validity
Construct validity threats might be due to the adopted experimental method-
ology including the selected datasets and DNN models. To mitigate this threat,
we used widely studied public datasets (MNIST [32] and CIFAR-10 [1]), and
applied DeepFault to multiple DNN models of different architectures with com-
petitive prediction accuracies (cf. Table 2). Also, we mitigate threats related to
the identification of suspicious neurons (Algorithm 1) by adapting suspiciousness
measures from the fault localisation domain in software engineering [63].
Internal validity threats might occur when establishing the ability of Deep-
Fault to synthesize new inputs that exercise the identified suspicious neurons.
To mitigate this threat, we used various distance metrics to confirm that the
synthesized inputs are close to the original inputs and similar to the inputs syn-
thesized by a random strategy. Another threat could be that the suspiciousness
measures employed by DeepFault accidentally outperform the random strategy.
To mitigate this threat, we reported the results of the random strategy over five
independent runs per experiment. Also, we ensured that the distribution of the
randomly selected suspicious neurons resembles the distribution of neurons iden-
tified by DeepFault suspiciousness measures. We also used the non-parametric
statistical test Mann-Whitney to check for significant difference in the perfor-
mance of DeepFault instances and random with a 95% confidence level.
External validity threats might exist if DeepFault cannot access the internal
DNN structure to assemble the hit spectrums of neurons and establish their sus-
piciousness. We limit this threat by developing DeepFault using the open-source
frameworks Keras and Tensorflow which enable whitebox DNN analysis. We also
examined various spectrum-based suspiciousness measures, but other measures
can be investigated [63]. We further reduce the risk that DeepFault might be dif-
ficult to use in practice by validating it against several DNN instances trained on
two widely-used datasets. However, more experiments are needed to assess the
applicability of DeepFault in domains and networks with characteristics different
from those used in our evaluation (e.g., LSTM and Capsules networks [50]).
6 Related Work
DNN Testing and Verification. The inability of blackbox DNN testing to
provide insights about the internal neuron activity and enable identification of
corner-case inputs that expose unexpected network behaviour [14], urged re-
searchers to leverage whitebox testing techniques from software engineering [28,
35,43,48,54]. DeepXplore [48] uses a differential algorithm to generate inputs that
increase neuron coverage. DeepGauge [35] introduces multi-granularity coverage
criteria for effective test synthesis. Other research proposes testing criteria and
techniques inspired by metamorphic testing [58], combinatorial testing [37], mu-
tation testing [36], MC/DC[54], symbolic execution [15] and concolic testing [55].
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Formal DNN verification aims at providing guarantees for trustworthy DNN
operation [20]. Abstraction refinement is used in [49] to verify safety properties of
small neural networks with sigmoid activation functions, while AI2 [12] employs
abstract interpretation to verify similar properties. Reluplex [26] is an SMT-
based approach that verifies safety and robustness of DNNs with ReLUs, and
DeepSafe [16] uses Reluplex to identify safe regions in the input space. DLV [60]
can verify local DNN robustness given a set of user-defined manipulations.
DeepFault adopts spectrum-based fault localisation techniques to systemati-
cally identify suspicious neurons and uses these neurons to synthesize new inputs,
which is mostly orthogonal to existing research on DNN testing and verification.
Adversarial Deep Learning. Recent studies have shown that DNNs are vul-
nerable to adversarial examples [57] and proposed search algorithms [8,40,41,44],
based on gradient descent or optimisation techniques, for generating adversarial
inputs that have a minimal difference to their original versions and force the DNN
to exhibit erroneous behaviour. These types of adversarial examples have been
shown to exist in the physical world too [29]. The identification of and protection
against these adversarial attacks, is another active area of research [45,59]. Deep-
Fault is similar to these approaches since it uses the identified suspicious neurons
to synthesize perturbed inputs which as we have demonstrated in Section 5 are
adversarial. Extending DeepFault to support the synthesis of adversarial inputs
using these adversarial search algorithms is part of our future work.
Fault Localization in Traditional Software. Fault localization is widely
studied in many software engineering areas including including software debug-
ging [46], program repair [17] and failure reproduction [21, 22]. The research
focus in fault localization is the development of identification methods and sus-
piciousness measures that isolate the root causes of software failures with re-
duced engineering effort [47]. The most notable fault localization methods are
spectrum-based [3,23,30,31,62], slice-based [64] and model-based [39]. Threats to
the value of empirical evaluations of spectrum-based fault localisation are stud-
ied in [53], while the theoretical analyses in [66,68] set a formal foundation about
desirable formal properties that suspiciousness measures should have. We refer
interested readers to a recent comprehensive survey on fault localization [63].
7 Conclusion
The potential deployment of DNNs in safety-critical applications introduces un-
acceptable risks. To reduce these risks to acceptable levels, DNNs should be
tested thoroughly. We contribute in this effort, by introducing DeepFault, the
first fault localization-based whitebox testing approach for DNNs. DeepFault
analyzes pre-trained DNNs, given a specific test set, to establish the hit spec-
trum of each neuron, identifies suspicious neurons by employing suspiciousness
measures and synthesizes new inputs that increase the activation values of the
suspicious neurons. Our empirical evaluation on the widely-used MNIST and
CIFAR-10 datasets shows that DeepFault can identify neurons which can be
held responsible for inadequate performance. DeepFault can also synthesize new
inputs, which closely resemble the original inputs, are highly adversarial and
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exercise the identified suspicious neurons. In future work, we plan to evaluate
DeepFault on other DNNs and datasets, to improve the suspiciousness-guided
synthesis algorithm and to extend the synthesis of adversarial inputs [44]. We will
also explore techniques to repair the identified suspicious neurons, thus enabling
to reason about the safety of DNNs and support safety case generation [7, 27].
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Appendix
Fault Localization in Software Engineering
TextText
Test suite 
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Program P
Test 
program P 
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Fig. 5. General fault localization for traditional software systems.
Additional Material for RQ5
Table 6. Ratios of increases in activations of k′ suspicious neurons with inputs that
are synthesized to increase activations of k neurons where k′ ≥ k in MNIST networks.
Synthesized inputs, most of the time, increase the activation values of the top k′ neurons
in addition to increasing the values of the top k suspicious neurons.
Tarantula Ochiai D∗
k
k′
1 2 3 5 10 1 2 3 5 10 1 2 3 5 10
1 1.0 0.98 0.94 0.90 0.78 1.0 1.0 0.96 0.97 0.90 1.0 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.84
2 1.0 0.98 0.91 0.81 1.0 0.99 0.99 0.89 1.0 0.98 0.98 0.87
3 0.98 0.97 0.87 1.0 0.99 0.90 1.0 1.0 0.91
5 0.98 0.89 0.98 0.91 1.0 0.90
10 0.91 0.97 0.94
Table 7. Ratios of increases in activations of k′ suspicious neurons with inputs that
are synthesized to increase activations of k neurons where k′ ≥ k in CIFAR networks.
Synthesized inputs, most of the time (except from D∗ case), increase the activation
values of the top k′ neurons in addition to increasing the values of the top k suspicious
neurons.
Tarantula Ochiai D∗
k
k′
10 20 30 40 50 10 20 30 40 50 10 20 30 40 50
10 0.95 0.91 0.92 0.90 0.89 0.95 0.92 0.92 0.91 0.89 0.81 0.61 0.56 0.32 0.15
20 0.96 0.94 0.92 0.90 0.97 0.95 0.94 0.91 0.78 0.49 0.31 0.15
30 0.94 0.92 0.91 0.92 0.91 0.90 0.79 0.33 0.15
40 0.95 0.93 0.97 0.93 0.65 0.17
50 0.94 0.91 0.7
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Additional Material for RQ2
Table 8. Statistical significance evaluation of techniques when compared to each other
on MNIST networks. A checkmark is put when a technique on the row has a signifi-
cantly better loss/accuracy value than the technique on the column for given network
and k parameter (k stands for number of suspicious neurons).
Tarantula Ochiai D∗
Technique Network k Loss Accuracy Loss Accuracy Loss Accuracy
1
2 X
3
5
MNIST 1
10
1
2
3
5
MNIST 2
10
1
2
3
5
Tarantula
MNIST 3
10
1 X X X
2 X X
3 X
5 X
MNIST 1
10 X
1 X
2
3 X X
5 X
MNIST 2
10 X
1 X
2
3
5 X
Ochiai
MNIST 3
10 X
1
2
3 X
5 X
MNIST 1
10 X
1
2
3 X
5
MNIST 2
10 X X
1
2 X
3 X
5 X
D∗
MNIST 3
10 X
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Table 9. Statistical significance evaluation of techniques when compared to each other
on CIFAR networks. A checkmark is put when a technique on the row has a significantly
better loss/accuracy value than the technique on the column for given network and k
parameter (k stands for number of suspicious neurons).
Tarantula Ochiai D∗
Technique Network k Loss Accuracy Loss Accuracy Loss Accuracy
10 X X
20 X X
30 X X
40 X X X
CIFAR 1
50 X X
10 X X
20 X X X
30 X X X
40 X X X X
CIFAR 2
50 X X X X
10 X X X X
20 X X X X
30 X X X X
40 X X X X
Tarantula
CIFAR 3
50 X X X X
10 X X
20 X X
30 X X
40 X X
CIFAR 1
50 X X
10 X X
20 X X
30 X X
40 X X
CIFAR 2
50 X X
10
20
30
40
Ochiai
CIFAR 3
50
10
20
30
40
CIFAR 1
50
10
20
30
40
CIFAR 2
50
10
20
30
40
D∗
CIFAR 3
50
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Table 10. Performance measurement of input perturbation in DeepFault. (mm:ss)
DNNs Susp. Measure k=1(10) k=2(20) k=3(30) k=5(40) k=10(50)
MNIST
T < 00:01 < 00:01 < 00:01 00:01 00:03
O < 00:01 < 00:01 < 00:01 00:01 00:03
D < 00:01 < 00:01 < 00:01 < 00:01 00:02
CIFAR
T 00:04 00:14 00:29 00:52 01:20
O 00:03 00:09 00:17 00:27 00:41
D 00:02 00:04 00:08 00:14 00:23
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